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INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
OONA A. HATHAWAY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
International law’s strength and reach have grown significantly over the last 
half-century. Once the province primarily of diplomatic and trade treaties, 
international law now reaches not just interactions between states but states’ 
behavior within their own borders as well. In the early years of the twenty-first 
century, more than 100,000 international treaties cover topics ranging from 
taxation to trade to torture—and just about everything in between.1 
This revolution in international law has brought with it many new 
challenges. Perhaps the greatest is the increasingly salient tension between the 
ideal of state sovereignty and the notion of international order based on law. 
State sovereignty requires that states have ultimate and independent authority 
to govern themselves and those within their territory. Yet states now routinely 
make legal promises that are perceived to lie in direct conflict with this 
conception of sovereignty, including delegating to international institutions 
authority that has traditionally been held exclusively by states. 
This progression has not been without controversy or resistance. Indeed, it 
has given rise to a powerful backlash in the United States and elsewhere. Critics 
of international law fear that its ever-expanding scope will encroach on 
domestic law and authority, taking power from local authorities and delegating 
it to international actors that are far removed—physically, culturally, and 
politically—from those they seek to govern. 
Much of the recent scholarly and public debate about international law has 
been motivated by these concerns. Beginning in the 1990s, a series of legal 
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scholars criticized international law as posing a threat to state sovereignty.2 
Sometimes termed the “New Sovereigntists,”3 these scholars regard much of 
international law as a threat to both internal and external sovereignty. Though 
their precise objections to international law are many and varied, one central 
theme holds constant across these criticisms: Modern international law gives too 
much power to foreign states and international organizations, stripping 
authority from domestic lawmaking institutions.4 This is especially true of 
international agreements in which states grant authority to international bodies 
to make decisions or take actions in a process referred to as “international 
delegation.” 
This article addresses the challenge to international law posed by these 
critiques. Although tension between international delegation and state 
sovereignty does exist, the recent body of work errs in assuming that states’ 
sovereignty almost always suffers when states delegate authority to 
international institutions. In doing so, recent scholarship portrays the costs of 
delegation as larger than they in fact are. Moreover, recent work has lost sight 
of some of the substantial benefits of cooperation. In short, this article takes 
seriously the frequently voiced concerns about state sovereignty but shows that 
the field of conflict between international law and sovereignty is not nearly as 
extensive as critics suggest. 
This is not just an academic discussion. In the last decade, U.S. leaders have 
proven acutely reluctant to join some of the most significant international 
initiatives. They have, for example, refused to delegate authority to 
international bodies designed to monitor and control emissions of greenhouse 
gases and to judge the conduct of persons who have committed the most 
egregious international crimes. These decisions should be reconsidered in light 
of a more careful accounting of the costs and benefits of international 
cooperation than has so far been offered by either the traditional international 
legal establishment or its New Sovereigntist challengers. 
The primary focus in what follows is international delegation, both because 
that is the latest focus of the literature (and the focus of the symposium of 
which this piece is a part) and because it is a domain in which sovereignty costs 
 
 2. Some of the key works in this vein include JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JOHN C. YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American 
Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 815 (1997). 
 3. The term was coined by Peter Spiro in his excellent article, The New Sovereigntists: American 
Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 9, available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2000/6.html (follow “The New Sovereigntists” hyperlink) (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2007). 
 4. For example, at a conference titled Trends in Global Governance: Do They Threaten American 
Sovereignty?, John Yoo, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, cautioned that “[n]ovel 
forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to 
international organizations that lack American openness and accountability.” UN Wars, US War 
Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 361 (2000). 
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are perceived to be most salient. However, this article also briefly examines 
aspects of international law that are not properly described as delegation. 
International law and international delegation are deeply intertwined: 
international delegation arises from international law, and most international 
law designed to have binding effect involves some form of delegation. Hence, it 
is often necessary to expand our field of vision to include both if we are to 
understand either one. 
Part II of this article outlines the challenge to sovereignty posed by 
international law and especially international delegation. Two decades ago, 
Robert Putnam used the metaphor of the two-level chess game to illustrate the 
influence that the domestic and international spheres can have on one another. 
Today, scholars continue this project, focusing in particular on when and how 
international legal commitments affect domestic governance. This conversation 
has most recently come to center on international delegation, for such 
delegations bring the perceived conflict between state sovereignty and 
international law to the fore. 
In Part III, I reconsider the sovereignty costs of international delegation, 
arguing in particular that when state consent to delegation is taken into account, 
the scope of conflict between sovereignty and international delegation is 
substantially narrowed. Nonetheless, international delegation can be in tension 
with state sovereignty, and the key sources of this tension are outlined as a 
preface to the discussion of the other side of the cost-benefit equation—namely, 
the potential benefits. 
Part IV turns to these benefits, examining how the intrusion of international 
law into areas that were once exclusively domestic might be explained and 
justified. Whether sovereignty costs lead us to question the wisdom of specific 
delegations hinges on the benefits that balance against those costs. Many acts of 
delegation, for example, allow states to achieve ends that would otherwise be 
unattainable, enhancing their authority over the longer term. Moreover (and 
more controversially), an imposition on state sovereignty might be justified by 
reference to other values—the well-being or rights of citizens chief among them. 
Exploring both sides of the equation in greater depth can lead to a deeper and 
more empirically grounded argument about the proper role of international law 
and delegation in an age of global interdependence. Doing so also reveals that 
international delegation is often more accurately seen as an exercise of state 
sovereign authority than a diminution of it. 
II 
THE SOVEREIGNTY CHALLENGE 
In the late 1980s, Robert Putnam proposed viewing the relationship 
between international and domestic politics through the lens of what he called 
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the “two-level game”:5 At the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the government to adopt their favored policies, and 
politicians seek power and influence by constructing coalitions among these 
groups. At the international level, governments aim to maximize their ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while at the same time seeking to avoid adverse 
foreign developments. Although Putnam was not thinking specifically of 
international delegation or international law when he wrote of the two-level 
game, the metaphor provides a useful tool for thinking about the ways in which 
international law and domestic politics are interwoven and mutually causative. 
In recent years, one half of the “game” described by Putnam—the impact of 
international law and politics on domestic law and politics—has become a 
central subject of debate in legal scholarship. Critics of international law have 
expressed concern about the instances in which international law infringes on 
domestic sovereign authority.6 Their discomfort, and hence their criticism, stems 
from the shared premise that the state ought to retain unfettered authority to 
make the laws that govern its own citizens.7 In this view, international law takes 
authority out of the hands of local decisionmakers and gives it to persons and 
locations far removed from those the law governs, undermining self-
government and the value of citizenship within the state in the process.8 
 
 5. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L 
ORG. 427 (1988). 
 6. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-
Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1567–82 (2003) (examining U.S. participation in international 
delegations and resulting implications for U.S. domestic sovereignty); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of 
Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
71, 88–113 (2000) (discussing the transfer of some federal powers to international organizations). See 
generally Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1492 (2004) (considering the constitutional implications of delegating legislative authority to 
international organizations); Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 527 (2003) (discussing the effects of globalization and globalized lawmaking on the structure 
of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. lawmaking). This debate has played out in the public eye most 
recently in the debate over the use of foreign and international law by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Kenneth 
Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL’Y REV., June–July 2005, at 33, available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/2932196.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (discussing 
the use of foreign and international law in recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions). 
 7. See Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1415–20 (2006) (reviewing The Limits of International Law, by Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, and discussing the underlying premise that states do, and should continue 
to, act in their own self-interest when complying with international law). 
 8. Moreover, when the countries affected are democratic, the critics raise the specter of not just a 
shift of power from local authorities to distant decisionmakers, but a shift of power from democratic 
domestic institutions to unelected, undemocratic, and unaccountable international organizations. New 
Sovereigntists, of course, are not the only ones who are worried about whether international 
institutions are sufficiently democratic and accountable. Even the strongest advocates of international 
law recognize the possible problems. See, e.g., Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability 
and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 (2005) (addressing the problem of 
accountability at the global level and suggesting methods for improvement). A three-year ongoing 
project in Global Administrative Law centered at NYU also aims to address such problems. See 
Institute for International Law and Justice, Welcome to the Website of the Global International Law 
Project, http://www.iilj.org/global_adlaw/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
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Political scientists who study international law have also considered the 
impact of international legal commitments on state sovereignty. In a paper 
published as part of a symposium on “Legalization and World Politics”—a 
symposium that signaled a renewed interest in international law among political 
scientists—Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal suggest that international law 
that is effective necessarily impinges on state sovereignty. “Sovereignty costs,” 
they argue, “range from simple differences in outcome on particular issues, to 
loss of authority over decisionmaking in an issue-area, to more fundamental 
encroachments on state sovereignty.”9 
If international agreements as a general matter impose sovereignty costs, as 
these prior works suggest, this must be all the more true of international 
delegation.10 In a typical international delegation, a state grants authority to an 
international body by ratifying an international treaty.11 Nearly all international 
delegations thus involve international agreements.12 The reverse, however, is 
not true: not all international agreements involve delegation. For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights13 is international law (though as a 
declaration, it is not legally binding), but it involves no international delegation 
because it does not grant authority to any international organization.14 
 
 9. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421, 436–37 (2000). Shortly before Abbott and Snidal, Andrew Moravcsik used the term to 
refer to “the surrender of national discretion” in a discussion of states’ decisions to accede to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: 
Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 227 (2000). The earliest use of the 
phrase seems to be in a discussion of the European Recovery Program by Robert Pahre, Multilateral 
Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 326, 349 (1994). 
 10. There is the separate question whether nonconsensual international law—customary law and 
jus cogens—imposes sovereignty costs. Because such international law never involves delegations of 
authority as defined in Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Winter 2008), the topic is put to one side in this paper. 
 11. Id. at 3–4. To be considered a delegation, it is not necessary that the actions of the international 
body be formally binding on states as a matter of international law—that is instead a factor to be 
considered in assessing the degree of delegation. Id. at 4. 
 12. If one includes delegation to private entities in the definition of “international delegation,” 
then it is possible to have an international delegation without an international agreement (consider the 
International Accounting Standard Board mentioned in id. at 8). However, the vast majority of 
international delegations (and the most significant ones substantively) are created by multilateral 
international agreements. 
 13. Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2007). 
 14. A substantial number of bilateral international agreements are binding but involve no 
delegation (extradition agreements, for example), but most multilateral agreements that are intended 
to be binding do include at least some minimal delegation. The Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is largely intended to set standards of conduct, but like most 
binding multilateral agreements it does include an explicit delegation: 
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or 
fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State 
for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 9, 
approved Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2007). (Notably, large numbers of ratifying states opted out of this delegation by 
entering reservations indicating either that they did not accept this provision or that their express 
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International delegations might be thought of, therefore, as including that 
subset of international agreements in which states explicitly relinquish authority 
to an international actor and, hence, in which sovereignty costs could be 
thought to be most salient. Indeed, an international agreement that does not 
involve a delegation of authority to an international institution likely imposes 
little or no sovereignty costs on states.15 It is the natural progression of this 
literature, therefore, to focus on international delegations, for it is here that 
some of the most significant issues lie. 
The remainder of this article considers the effects of international 
delegation on state sovereignty, which lies at the core of the current debate over 
international agreements and state sovereignty. If we can find a way to manage 
the conflict between sovereignty and international law here, where it is so 
pronounced, then perhaps that resolution can serve as a guide to reconciliation 
of the broader conflict. 
III 
SOVEREIGNTY COSTS OF DELEGATION RECONSIDERED 
To evaluate the critique of international delegation, it is necessary first to 
consider more carefully the concept of sovereignty, which lies at the heart of 
delegation. As noted above, the term “sovereignty costs” is generally used in 
legal and political-science literature to refer to reductions in state autonomy, or, 
more precisely, to intervention in the domestic authority structure. It is worth 
pausing to further unpack this conception of sovereignty before proceeding to 
consider whether and how international delegations impinge on it. 
State sovereignty is best understood as a bundle of properties rather than as 
a single characteristic.16 Four of these properties stand out: (1) the authority to 
 
consent would be required to submit a dispute under the Genocide Convention to the International 
Court of Justice.) 
 15. Whether international law that does not involve a delegation of authority to an international 
institution gives rise to sovereignty costs depends in part on precisely how one defines sovereignty 
costs. If one accepts Abbott and Snidal’s definition of sovereignty costs as encompassing everything 
from “simple differences in outcome on particular issues” to “fundamental encroachments on state 
sovereignty,” then any international law that is effective (that is, that modifies state behavior in some 
way) necessarily imposes a sovereignty cost. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 9, at 436. Yet taken literally at 
least, this seems an excessively broad definition, for it means that any event or action that leads to a 
different outcome imposes a cost on state sovereignty. As discussed below, more widely accepted today 
is a definition that emphasizes reductions in state autonomy. See, e.g., Bradley & Kelley, supra note 10, 
at 27 (citing recent definitions). By this definition, international agreements that do not include a 
delegation would be highly unlikely to entail sovereignty costs. 
 16. This definition builds on, but is distinct from, classical conceptions of sovereignty. In the 
classical view, a sovereign must not only be the highest and final authority, but its authority must also 
be absolute, unlimited, and exclusive. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 40 (1902) (“[T]here . . . must be in all of [the several forms of government] a supreme, 
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of 
sovereignty, reside.”). Hobbes and Rousseau shared this view. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 155 
(E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1881); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 69 (Maurice 
Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1969) (1762). Few scholars today would agree that sovereignty must be 
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govern,17 (2) the supremacy of the governing authority,18 (3) the independence of 
the governing authority, and finally (4) the territoriality of the governing 
authority.19 
The third of these characteristics deserves special attention here. To be 
sovereign, a state must be independent, which means that the state cannot be 
put under a duty or obligation by those external to it. Historically, the issue of 
sovereign-state independence has come up most commonly in the context of 
colonial relationships. Modern issues of dependence and independence tend to 
be less starkly all-or-nothing. In discussions of state sovereignty, independence 
refers to the degree to which a state is free from external authority. H.L.A. Hart 
put it thus: “[T]he word ‘sovereign’ means here no more than ‘independent’ . . . 
. [A] sovereign state is one not subject to certain types of control, and its 
sovereignty is that area of conduct in which it is autonomous.”20 
Turning now to international delegations, the definition offered for this 
symposium states that an international delegation is “a grant of authority by 
two or more states to an international body to make decision or take actions.”21 
When such grants of authority are made, a state may be said to relinquish some 
degree of autonomy. And, indeed, this is the claim of those concerned about the 
effect of delegations on sovereign authority: Having delegated authority to an 
 
absolute and unlimited, and that absolute and unlimited sovereignty is not an element of the definition 
offered here.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS, AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE 177–93 (1998). 
 17. A has sovereignty over B if A has the authority to govern the behavior of B, for example, by 
making rules that constrain B’s conduct. See THOMAS POGGE, 103 ETHICS 48, 57 (1992); Pogge begins 
his description of state sovereignty by considering sovereignty as a two-place relation: 
A is sovereign over B if and only if 
(1) A is a governmental body or officer . . . , and 
(2) B are persons, and 
(3) A has unsupervised and irrevocable authority over B (a) to lay down rules constraining 
their conduct; or (b) to judge their compliance with rules; or (c) to enforce rules against them 
through preemption, prevention, or punishments; or (d) to act in their behalf vis-à-vis other 
agencies . . . or persons . . . . 
Id. 
 18. To be sovereign, the state has to be not just an authority, but the highest authority. See, e.g., 
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 177 (“An authority may be ultimate if it is the highest authority.”). 
Sovereignty thus requires a “hierarchy of authorities,” id., with one superseding all others. In the 
United States, for example, the federal government is supreme over state governments, because on 
matters within its purview its rules and judgments supersede those of the states. It must, moreover, be 
final. The sovereign’s decision must not be subject to appeal, for if it were, the authority to which the 
decision is appealed would be higher than the sovereign itself. See F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2d 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1966) (defining sovereignty as the “final and absolute authority in 
the political community”). Stephen Krasner expresses a similar idea when he notes that Westphalian 
sovereignty rests on “the exclusion of external actors from [domestic] authority structures.” 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 4 (1999). 
 19. Territoriality is a distinctive characteristic of modern state sovereignty. It means that each state 
is associated with a defined territorial space and each territorial space is associated with a particular 
governing state authority. Of course, the appropriate governing authority and precise territorial bounds 
may be contested. For example, both the states of India and Pakistan claim sovereignty over the 
territory of Kashmir. Indeed, the very fact that this is a significant source of conflict serves to illustrate 
how usual it is to have unsettled authority over any particular territorial space. 
 20. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 217 (1st ed. 1961). 
 21. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 10, at 3. 
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international body, the state is subsequently bound by the decisions and actions 
taken by that body. Hence, the argument continues, the state sacrifices 
independence. 
There is a significant flaw with this argument, however: It ignores the 
consensual nature of delegation. The “grant of authority” that creates a 
delegation is based upon the longstanding principle of sovereign consent—the 
idea that international law that binds states “emanate[s] from their own free will 
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law.”22 This principle of sovereign consent continues as a central 
principle of international law. The international agreements that states enter 
when they grant authority to an international body thus require explicit state 
consent. Indeed, modern international law leaves even the specific 
requirements for ratification to domestic authorities to decide, requiring only 
that the state’s authorized representative express the state’s consent.23 
Even more important than the initial consent to international delegations is 
the conditional nature of nearly all such delegations. In most international 
delegations, states retain the power to revoke authority after it has been 
granted. As a consequence, states remain free from external control in any 
meaningful sense, for they are controlled by the decisions of the international 
body only so long as they agree to be. Once their agreement ceases, the control 
over them ceases as well. 
It is surprising, then, that in the extensive discussions of the clash between 
international delegation and state sovereignty there has been relatively little 
discussion of the role of consent—of whether states have control over the 
decision to delegate authority and when they have the power to monitor and to 
revoke that authority. If international delegations exist only when domestic 
lawmaking authorities say they do, then international delegations are not best 
understood as contrary to legitimate domestic authority; they are instead better 
understood as another site through which that authority is expressed.24 State 
consent to international law thus holds out the promise of reconciling 
international delegation and state sovereignty, transforming them into allies 
rather than opponents. 
And yet, this does not eliminate all concerns. Even though consent is usually 
present, there remain potential, sometimes unavoidable, conflicts between 
 
 22. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). 
 23. See United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11–17, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties]. 
 24. To take just one example, when a state joins the World Trade Organization, it retains the 
power to withdraw from the Organization. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade 
Organization [World Trade Organization] art. XV, ¶ 1, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter 
Agreement Establishing the WTO]. In these circumstances, it is wrong to say that member states have 
suffered from a meaningful loss of state sovereignty, for states retain the power to revoke that 
authority. 
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international delegations and state sovereignty. These points of tension can best 
be explored by considering a series of questions that are raised by acts of 
delegation.25 First, who consents to the delegation? Second, what happens when 
preferences change? Third, what happens when the delegated authority extends 
its reach beyond the scope originally granted? Fourth, what if consent is the 
result of asymmetric power?26 
A. Consent by Whom? 
Under the principle of sovereign consent, a state can be required to follow 
the rules that an international agreement lays out only if it has voluntarily 
agreed to be bound.27 This is an important fact for international delegation, 
because delegations are all made by international agreement. Thus the power to 
accept or reject an international agreement is the power to accept or reject a 
delegation of authority. Yet this argument rests on an assumption that the body 
that is bound (the “state”) is the same as that which consents. But this 
assumption is called into some question on closer inspection of who is 
consenting. 
Political scientists have often talked of states as “rational unitary actors” 
who act in a purposeful way to achieve self-interested goals. Legal scholars, too, 
frequently think of states as unitary actors—at least in the context of treaty 
ratification—perhaps in part because international law in fact has its origins in 
private contracts between individual princes.28 In this view, then, state “consent” 
to a treaty could be treated much like a contract between individuals. 
The idea of consent is much more complicated, however, when we 
acknowledge that states are not, in fact, unitary actors. Decisions to ratify 
(formally consent to) treaties and the regimes that they create are the end result 
of domestic politics, which involves filtering often-conflicting interests of 
 
 25. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 10, at 2–4. 
 26. Were this article focused on international law more broadly, it would need to include a fifth 
category: when consent is not required. Customary international law does not rest on express state 
consent as does international treaty law. I am aware of no delegations, however, that are made through 
customary international law. 
 27. For more on the broader topic of the voluntary nature of treaties, see Oona A. Hathaway, 
Between Power and Principle, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005). See also Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties art. 34 (“A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. I, 
introductory note, at 18 (1987) (“Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by states which 
constitute the system.”); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 (1995) 
(“For treaties, consent is essential. No treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is binding 
on a state unless it has consented to it.”). 
 28. See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (Michael Byers trans., 
Walter de Gruyter 2000) (discussing treaty-making among sovereigns in the Middle Ages). In the 
earliest years of international law, treaties were considered to be private contracts between the 
signatory princes. The princes represented only themselves and not an abstract “state.” Hence the law 
that applied to private contracts applied to treaties. Christian Baldus, The Roman Peace Treaty, in 
PEACE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE 
AGES TO WORLD WAR ONE 103, 113–17 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004). This continued until around 
1540, when the concept of the internal sovereignty of the state apparently began to emerge. 
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multiple actors through domestic political institutions.29 Hence, the decision to 
ratify a treaty that delegates authority may have the support of only some—
possibly even a minority—of citizens of the state. 
The same can be said, of course, of domestic legislation. It is a necessary fact 
of lawmaking that some will support the result and some will not. The 
likelihood that legislation will be supported by only a minority of the 
population of course depends in significant part on the composition of the 
government, the lawmaking process, and how accurately it reflects the will of 
the governed. In even the most democratic of states, it is possible—maybe even 
inevitable—that laws will be made that have the support of only a fraction of 
the citizenry. The fact that international law is likely to have less than complete 
support among the citizenry thus cannot, by itself, serve as a special reason for 
questioning international law’s legitimacy and is, in any case, not relevant to the 
central focus here: the tension between international law and states’ 
sovereignty. The sovereigntist challenge to international law arises instead from 
the fact that a treaty need not have the support of the political actors who are 
ordinarily empowered to make domestic legislation, because the process of 
ratifying treaties may be different from that for creating ordinary legislation. It 
is this difference that has the potential to generate tension between domestic 
authority and international law even in the face of state consent. 
International law provides that to bind itself to a treaty agreement, a state 
need only ratify it. The specific requirements for ratification are determined by 
domestic law and hence vary across states.30 Some, for example, require that the 
chief executive officer’s agreement is sufficient for a treaty to be ratified, others 
require that the treaty be approved through the same process used to pass 
regular legislation, and still others adopt some process in between. The United 
States falls in the middle of the two extremes: the Constitution calls for the 
President to submit a treaty to the Senate, which then must approve it by an 
affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members.31 More important, the United 
States provides for a ratification process that differs in significant ways from its 
 
 29. In my view, state behavior is the end result of a contest for control by multiple political actors 
within the state, mediated by domestic political institutions. This perspective is most closely identified 
with what political scientists would call “liberal institutionalism.” For overviews of this approach from 
the political-science and legal perspectives, respectively, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences 
Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 (2000); see also Peter Alexis 
Gourevitch, Squaring the Circle: The Domestic Sources of International Cooperation, 50 INT’L ORG. 349 
(1996). 
 30. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11–17. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. Compared to the ratification processes specified in every existing 
national constitution in the world, the U.S. system—in which the House is involved in making federal 
statutes but not in treaty-making—is unusual. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Domestic Political 
Foundations of International Law: Codebook (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see 
also PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES (Stefan A. 
Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott eds., 1994). 
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process for passing ordinary legislation.32 Indeed, the ratification process 
excludes the House of Representatives entirely from the treaty-making 
process.33 Even more distinct from the normal lawmaking process—though 
more restricted in their use—are sole executive agreements, which exclude 
Congress altogether.34 
When domestic actors choose a process for ratifying treaties that differs in 
important ways from the process used to pass ordinary legislation (as does the 
United States), international law might be used as an end-run around the 
domestic political process. If the two political processes differ, government 
actors might use international law to gain leverage over domestic policy choices. 
This type of two-level game is particularly likely to occur when the government 
actors who have influence or control over international law are different in their 
policy positions and goals from those who have influence or control over 
domestic law. Furthermore, these efforts can be expected to be more 
pronounced in cases in which control of government by one party is tenuous 
and, hence, those currently in control of foreign policymaking seek to delegate 
authority to an international body in order to constrain their successors. For 
example, research shows that as the number of government actors who can stop 
legislation (known in political science as “veto players”) increases, states 
become more likely to seek agreements with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) that “force” actors to make policy changes.35 
 
 32. This is all the more distinctive because the United States also makes international treaties part 
of the supreme law of the land, meaning that they are treated as self-executing unless specified 
otherwise. For more on self-executing treaties, see Bradley, supra note 6 (considering the constitutional 
implications of U.S international delegation); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 760 (1988) (discussing the legal effects of international treaties on individual constitutional rights); 
David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 
(2002) (analyzing the modern doctrine of non-self-executing treaties and the balance between 
conflicting rules of law and the separation of powers principle); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based 
Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992) (surveying the rights of individuals 
under international treaties). 
 33. Indeed, the United States is unusual among democracies in its exclusion of part of the 
legislative apparatus from the decision to ratify treaties. In the vast majority of states, the process used 
to ratify treaties is functionally equivalent to that used for passing legislation. Hathaway, supra note 31. 
 34. Congressional–executive agreements, by contrast, require a majority vote in each house of 
Congress, just as does ordinary federal legislation (hence, they avoid many of the problems outlined 
here). There are questions, however, about whether congressional–executive agreements are an 
adequate constitutional substitute for the advice and consent of the Senate required by the 
Constitution. The debate is discussed in depth in BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA 
CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995). 
 35. See James Raymond Vreeland, Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter Into Agreements? 
Statistically Selected Cases, 24 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 321 (2003) (arguing that as the number of veto 
players increases, executives are more likely to turn to IMF agreements); James R. Vreeland, 
Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements (UCLA Int’l Inst., Global Fellows Working Papers  
(2004)), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context= 
international (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (contending that governments that are more constrained 
domestically often seek to use IMF agreements to push through unpopular policies that would 
otherwise be impossible to achieve). For related arguments, see MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 13 (1988) (putting forward a “boomerang” model of 
international politics); Luigi Spaventa, Two Letters of Intent, in IMF CONDITIONALITY 441, 463 (John 
Williamson ed., 1983) (arguing that IMF demands allowed the Italian government and Italian unions to 
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Even when there is no difference in the actors who are engaged in 
international and domestic lawmaking, there may still be differences among the 
lawmaking processes that allow some government actors to achieve policy aims 
that might otherwise be unattainable. By their very nature, multilateral 
agreements do not permit line-by-line negotiation of the law.36 Unlike standard 
legislation, therefore, domestic legislatures must take or leave a pre-formed 
package. Bilateral agreements are more amenable to specific negotiation. Even 
then, however, legislators have less control over the final shape of the law than 
they ordinarily do over domestic legislation, because it is necessary to gain the 
assent not only of all the relevant domestic actors, but also of another country’s 
representative (who must respond to her own domestic constituencies).37 
It is sometimes possible, in other words, for a subset of domestic political 
actors to use consensual international law to achieve policy goals that it cannot 
achieve through domestic politics—delegating authority to an international 
body or group of states that will in turn impose policies on the state that the 
domestic government never could or never would.38 
This concern can be mitigated, however, without putting an end to 
international delegations. Individual states can address the problem by 
 
force their constituencies to accept unpopular, but necessary, fiscal programs to help turn around Italy’s 
economic recession in the mid-1970s); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International 
Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881, 911 (1978) (“The international system is not only a 
consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them.”); Moravcsik, supra note 9, at 226 
(“[I]nternational institutional commitments, like domestic institutional commitments, are self-
interested means of ‘locking in’ particular preferred domestic policies . . . in the face of future political 
uncertainty.”); Putnam, supra note 5, at 457 (“[Governments exploit] IMF pressure to facilitate policy 
moves that [are] otherwise infeasible internally.”). 
 36. In many cases, states may enter Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUDs)—
which, in effect, permit states a limited line-item veto. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
art. 19; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 100–30 (2000). RUDs are subject to 
abuse, as they are much less visible and less well understood than treaty ratification. Hence a state may 
ratify a treaty in order to obtain the benefits of membership, and then issue RUDs that make that 
commitment unenforceable. In fact, the United States did just that in the cases of the United Nations 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr.pdf, and the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf. To avoid these problems, some multilateral agreements 
prohibit or restrict the use of RUDs. See, e.g., Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
art. XVI, para. 5 (“No reservations may be made in respect of any provisions of this Agreement. 
Reservations . . . of the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the 
extent provided for in those Agreements.”). 
 37. There are two other potentially important differences between international and domestic 
lawmaking. First, in international lawmaking, the president generally has the origination power, 
whereas in domestic lawmaking, the origination power generally rests with the legislative branch. 
Second, some states permit executives to enter into congressional–executive agreements or sole 
executive agreements with other states—agreements that in some cases extend beyond the usual scope 
for unilateral executive authority and hence give the executive greater lawmaking power than in the 
domestic context. 
 38. For example, Steve Charnovitz argues that “trade negotiations are . . . used to effectuate 
domestic policy reform,” specifically citing the example of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs agreement). See Steve Charnovitz, Patent Harmonization under World 
Trade Rules, 1 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 127, 133 (1998). 
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narrowing the differences between their international and domestic lawmaking 
processes. In the United States, that would mean concluding more international 
agreements (hence making more international delegations) through the 
procedure for congressional–executive agreements (which requires passage by a 
majority of both houses of Congress, as does domestic legislation) rather than 
through the Article II treaty process (which, as noted above, requires a two-
thirds vote in the Senate alone). This would make it significantly more difficult 
for political actors to use international law as an end-run around domestic 
lawmaking processes. It would also bring the country into better alignment with 
international practice, for very few states have systems for making international 
and domestic laws that are as different as are those of the United States.39 
Opening the black box of the state and asking who consents to an 
international delegation considerably complicates the simple story of consent 
with which this Part began. In some cases, domestic actors might use 
international delegation to harness the power of international bodies to press 
policies that might not receive support from domestic legal and political 
institutions. In some cases, the differences between domestic and international 
lawmaking might mean that even wholly consensual delegations lie in some 
tension with state sovereignty.40 This tension, however, is a product not of 
international law, but of the domestic rules of individual states that govern 
international and domestic lawmaking. Hence, state sovereignty can be 
effectively protected by revising these rules rather than by relinquishing the tool 
of international delegation. 
B. Time-Inconsistent Preferences 
There is a second and related difficulty with treating “state consent” to 
international delegation as the central answer to concerns about how delegation 
might undermine domestic authority. States are not only made up of multiple 
actors who may have different preferences from one another. They are also 
made up of a shifting constellation of actors who may individually and 
collectively have different preferences across time. Political leaders may simply 
change their preferences, perhaps due to new information or a change in 
circumstances. Even more important, many fundamental facts about a state are 
subject to change over time—the political leaders might be replaced by leaders 
 
 39. For a detailed argument for this change, see Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, 
Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2008) (on file with author). See also ACKERMAN & GOLOVE, supra note 34; U.S. Department of State, 
Circular 175 Procedure, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2007) 
(discussing the Circular 175 Procedure, which “refers to regulations developed by the State 
Department to ensure the proper exercise of the treaty-making power”). 
 40. As discussed in brief below, one might argue that such restrictions on domestic authority are a 
good thing, either because they allow more efficient outcomes or because they protect other values. 
This might be particularly true if the domestic government is not democratic and hence does not pursue 
the citizenry’s interests. 
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place, a state need not maintain a significant military presence to protect the 
area from foreign intrusion, and the state and its citizens can engage in 
investments in infrastructure, buildings, and the like without fear of usurpation. 
None of this would be possible if the states that are parties to the agreement 
were not committed to abide by the agreement, regardless of their preferences 
later in time. 
Nonetheless, the principle of continuity gives rise to problems for the 
concept of state consent. An international agreement permits the current 
domestic political actors to bind their future counterparts. That may be 
unproblematic when the government remains consistent over time. Yet it can be 
harder to defend when a government undergoes a significant change. Since 
1960, for example, the 187 states that presently have some form of 
constitutional regime have adopted entirely new constitutions (not simply 
minor amendments) a total of 261 times.44 In addition, since 1945, forty-nine 
countries have experienced considerable short-term improvements in 
democracy and many more have experienced significant longer-term 
improvements.45 Such shifts can create circumstances in which the state that is 
bound by an international agreement is importantly different from the state that 
consented to the agreement in the first place. This problem is all the more 
pressing when an agreement calls for the state to delegate authority to an 
international body, for in those cases a state is not only obligated to abide by an 
agreed standard of conduct, but by rules and regulations made by the body to 
which authority has been delegated. 
In such cases, the principle of continuity might permit a government that 
represented a small subset of the population to not only bind the population 
living under its rule, but also project its control forward in time to bind the 
country in the future. Even when there has been less radical change—one party 
loses control and another gains it—there may be similar concerns. If the reason 
for the change in party is a rejection by the population of the views of the old 
party, then permitting the old party to effectively retain power through 
previously made international delegations seems once again to frustrate popular 
control. 
Again, this problem is not limited to the international-law context. The 
same dilemma faces domestic laws enacted by a prior government. 
Constitutions, in general, can be understood as self-binding mechanisms 
intended to provide some shelter from the turbulent winds of social and 
political change. After all, the U.S. Constitution sometimes requires unelected 
judges and elected officials to defy the popular will to do what they believe the 
U.S. Constitution requires. This gives rise to the well-known anti-majoritarian 
 
 44. Author’s calculations, based on the dataset described in Hathaway, supra note 31. 
 45. More specifically, forty-nine countries experienced at least a three-point, one-year 
improvement in the ten-point “democracy” scale from Polity. There were 172 instances in which states’ 
democracy scores increased by at least one point—often for several years in a row. Author’s 
calculations, based on the Polity Dataset. 
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(or counter-majoritarian) difficulty: How can decisions to defy the popular will 
be legitimate in a nation that traces its power to the people’s will? As Laurence 
Tribe succinctly puts it, 
[i]n its most basic form, the question in such cases is why a nation that rests legality on 
the consent of the governed would choose to constitute its political life in terms of 
commitments to an original agreement—made by the people, binding on their 
children, and deliberately structured so as to be difficult to change.46 
Most who have considered such questions conclude that the answer to the 
puzzle must be that such self-imposed constraints allow the nation to achieve 
ends closer to the true popular will over the long term than would be possible 
were the polity not constitutionally constrained—a point discussed in more 
detail below.47 
The claim that constitutional constraints give rise in the long term to 
governance that reflects the true will of the people rests on a series of 
assumptions—among them that it is possible for representative processes to 
ever in fact meaningfully reflect majority will, and that the constitutional 
constraints can succeed in checking momentary whims and, at the same time, 
not excessively inhibit change and thus produce stagnation. The latter 
assumption rests on a claim that the constitutional regime strikes the right 
balance—resisting and permitting change in correct measure. Most domestic 
legal systems, therefore, do not prohibit changes to higher law. They instead 
address the problem of time-inconsistent preferences by providing that the 
domestic laws remain binding unless and until those laws are formally revoked 
or changed. The process required to change the laws may be more or less 
cumbersome depending on how resistant to change they are intended to be—
that is, how securely the nation wishes to bind itself. 
The majority of treaties adopt a similar solution: States retain the authority 
to revoke power that has been delegated to an international institution through 
a treaty, either by denouncing or by withdrawing from the relevant treaty.48 The 
treaty may be very easy to denounce or may include any number of hurdles, 
 
 46. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1988). 
 47. See discussion supra Part III.A. Tribe argues that this remains an important puzzle of 
constitutional theory, but suggests that the “outlines of an answer” can come from studying impulse 
control. He cites a study that suggests that even pigeons are capable of acting to “bind their ‘own future 
freedom of choice’ in order to reap the rewards of acting in ways that would elude them under the 
pressures of the moment.” Id. at 11. Jon Elster considers similar questions and arrives at a similar 
conclusion. He argues that “inconsistent time preferences” arise in part from “weakness of will”—that 
is, the tendency to privilege the present over the future. This weakness of will leads individuals to act in 
ways that later give rise to regret. A rational response to such irrational impulses, Elster argues, is for 
an individual to seek to bind its later self—that is, to adopt the “Ulysses strategy.” JON ELSTER, 
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 65–76 (1979). 
 48. The majority of treaties include provisions for withdrawal in the treaty text itself. Those that do 
not are generally considered to be governed by Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which applies to treaties completed after 1980. For more on treaty exit and the related 
decision to “unsign” a treaty, see Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005); 
Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061 (2002). Bradley and Kelley discuss the related 
issue of “permanence” of the delegation. Bradley & Kelley, supra note 10, at 20–24. 
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including time restrictions or specific consent requirements.49 Even when exit is 
entirely unrestricted, reputational concerns may nonetheless keep states from 
withdrawing, even if they no longer support the treaty. (Consider, for example, 
the international uproar that followed the United States’ decision to “unsign” 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.)50 
Finally, some treaties create obligations that are not just difficult, but are 
impossible for states to escape. Treaties that prohibit unilateral exit or 
withdrawal are uncommon, but they do exist.51 A particularly notable example is 
the United Nations (UN) Charter, which does not contain any provision on exit 
and is generally (though not universally) regarded as an irrevocable treaty.52 
Indeed, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention) adopts a default rule providing that states may not unilaterally exit 
from a treaty that does not explicitly provide for denunciation or withdrawal.53 
Under the Vienna Convention, even a fundamental change in circumstances 
cannot be invoked as grounds for withdrawing from or terminating a treaty, 
except in very limited circumstances.54 These provisions stand in tension with 
the principle of state sovereignty, which is no doubt why they are so rare. 55 
 
 49. Helfer, examining the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs Handbook of Final Clauses, 
identifies six types of denunciation and withdrawal clauses: 
(1) treaties that may be denounced at any time; (2) treaties that preclude denunciation for a 
fixed number of years, calculated either from the date the agreement enters into force or from 
the date of ratification by the state; (3) treaties that permit denunciation only at fixed time 
intervals; (4) treaties that may be denounced only on a single occasion, identified either by 
time period or upon the occurrence of a particular event; (5) treaties whose denunciation 
occurs automatically upon the state’s ratification of a subsequently-negotiated agreement; and 
(6) treaties that are silent as to denunciation or withdrawal. 
Supra note 48, at 1597. 
 50. Todd S. Purdum, A Wider Atlantic: Europe Sees a Grotesque U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at 
A3. 
 51. There is no comprehensive data currently available on the number of treaties that include the 
various types of exit provisions. In the human-rights area, Larry Helfer identifies only four treaties that 
do not contain denunciation clauses. See id. at 1642 n.172. Helfer also notes that “[t]reaties that 
expressly preclude unilateral exit are uncommon.” Id. at 1593 n.31. 
 52. See Kelvin Widdows, The Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing No Denunciation 
Clause, in 53 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 99–100 (1982) (discussing the lack of 
withdrawal provisions in the UN Charter and stating that only one country has made a partial attempt 
to withdraw); Egon Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo, 61 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 661, 671 (1967) (discussing Indonesia’s withdrawal attempt and stating, “Members of the 
United Nations have the right to withdraw . . . but only in . . . exceptional circumstances”); Joseph H.H. 
Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the European 
Economic Community, 20 ISRAEL L. REV. 282 (1985) (discussing withdrawal from the European 
Economic Community). 
 53. One of the best modern discussions of the topic is Laurence R. Helfer, supra note 48. For 
earlier works on the topic, see Widdows, supra note 52; Schwelb, supra note 52, at 671; Weiler, supra 
note 52. 
 54. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62. Specifically, the Vienna Convention states, 
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at 
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be 
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence 
of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound 
by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
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States may deal with the problem of time-inconsistent preferences in a 
variety of ways. They can ameliorate it in significant part by ensuring that 
delegations are revocable. A treaty need not permit costless revocation to 
address sovereignty concerns, but it must allow states to revoke the delegation 
so that major changes in public opinion or in the circumstances underlying the 
international delegation can be addressed. Individual states might insist on 
including a withdrawal clause in treaties before they accede. They might, 
moreover, choose to make agreements informally rather than formally, for 
informal agreements tend to be more flexible.56 
Addressing the problem of time-inconsistent preferences after the fact is 
more difficult, but not impossible. States might seek to renegotiate the earlier 
agreement to address new concerns. When renegotiation is not possible, states 
face the decision whether to violate their international legal commitments and 
accept the significant consequences that might follow—both those specifically 
provided in the agreement and the more general sanctions that can attend state 
violations of a legitimate international legal obligation (as well as the harm to 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda57 that undergirds the international legal 
system). Where states have delegated authority, they might simply cease to 
recognize or follow the decisions of the international institution. Most states, in 
fact, allow some form of subsequent modification of international law’s 
domestic effect, even when doing so might place the state in violation of 
international law. In the United States, for example, Congress can pass 
legislation that implements, modifies, or even contradicts a treaty obligation. 
Such legislation, the courts have ruled, always takes precedence over the treaty 
itself.58 This hands Congress an immense power to shape the domestic effect of a 
 
Id. 
 55. This remains a matter of debate. See Helfer, supra note 48, and Widdows, supra note 52. 
 56. Informal agreements tend to be more subject to renegotiation after the fact than are formal 
written agreements. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 
INT’L ORG. 495 (1991) (discussing informal agreements in general). That very flexibility, however, can 
be a drawback as well, for all the reasons discussed above. 
 57. Latin phrase meaning “agreements must be kept.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 58. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 677 (2005) (per curiam) (“[W]herever the 
Convention, which has been in continuous force since 1969, conflicts with this subsequently enacted 
statute, the statute must govern.”); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (“We have 
held ‘that an Act of Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is 
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty 
null.’” (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion))); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating that when an act of legislation conflicts with the self-executing provisions 
of a treaty, “the one last in date will control the other”); Curtis Bradley & Lori Fisler Damrosch, 
Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 667, 680 (2004–
2005) (calling the doctrine of the relationship between statutes and treaties that gives subsequently 
enacted statutes precedence “well-settled”); Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-
Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005) (arguing that federal statutes should 
govern when enacted after the adoption of a treaty). The enactment of subsequent contrary legislation 
may very well leave the country in violation of international law, but that law would be unenforceable 
in domestic courts. In order for the treaty to no longer be binding according to international law, the 
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treaty commitment even after it has been made and even if international law 
does not permit unilateral change or revocation. Again, however, these 
enactments affect only the domestic legal effect of the international 
commitment. Despite the new law revoking the power of the treaty—and of the 
international organization that oversees it—within the state, the law may 
nonetheless remain binding as a matter of international law, and the failure to 
abide by it might bring consequences in the form of reciprocal defection and 
retaliation by other states or enforcement through international organizations. 
In sum, the time-inconsistent preferences of political actors over time can 
mean that state consent to international delegation is more problematic than it 
might at first appear. This problem is a narrow one—and can be largely averted 
if the agreements that create delegations provide withdrawal procedures—but is 
real nonetheless. 
C. Unintended Consequences 
When a state grants authority to an international body to take action or 
make decisions, that consent rests on a certain expectation of what the 
international body will do with the authority granted to it. But once the 
authority has been given away, states inevitably lose some control over the 
exercise of it. Hence, the authority states mean to delegate to an international 
body can sometimes differ from the authority later exercised by that same 
international body. This might be called the problem of unintended 
consequences of delegation.59 The existence of such unintended consequences is 
perhaps the single most salient reason for the tension between international 
delegation and state sovereignty. 
A particularly notable example of unintended consequences of international 
delegation is the European Community (EC). Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas 
Brunell argue that the transformation of the European Community from an 
organization of sovereign states governed by international law into a “multi-
tiered system of governance founded on higher-law constitutionalism” was 
unanticipated—indeed even opposed—by many member states. They argue 
that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) “constitutionalized” Europe through 
what can only be seen as judicial fiat, by expanding the zone of its own 
discretion over time. It did so most notably by ruling that in any conflict 
 
country must formally withdraw from it. For more on treaty withdrawal, see sources cited supra note 
53. 
 59. This concept of unintended consequences is related to principal–agent slack, which has been 
extensively explored by political scientists and legal scholars in the areas of legislative and judicial 
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 
1206 (1990–1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432–37 
(1986–1987); William R. Dougan & Michael C. Munger, The Rationality of Ideology, 32 J.L. & ECON. 
119 (1989); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing 
for Principal–Agent Slack in Political Institutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103 (1990); Joseph P. Kalt & Mark 
A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984); 
John McArthur & Stephen V. Marks, Constituent Interest vs. Legislator Ideology: The Role of Political 
Opportunity Cost, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 461 (1988). 
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between EC and national law, EC law must be given primacy (a principle now 
referred to as the doctrine of “supremacy”), and that the EC confers legal rights 
on individuals that national governments must respect, and which can be 
pleaded, and must be enforced, in national courts (a principle now referred to 
as the doctrine of “direct effect”). Neither principle, Sweet and Brunell 
emphasize, was provided in the treaty that created the EC.60 States, in other 
words, created the European Community and the ECJ and delegated authority 
to them. They did not anticipate that the ECJ would seize the opportunity to 
reinterpret its mandate to expand its authority in ways not sanctioned or 
approved by the member states. 
The existence of “unratified treaty amendments” has a similar effect. As 
Curtis Bradley explains, unratified treaty amendments are “changes to treaties 
proposed by international bodies that become binding upon parties to the treaty 
without the expectation of a national act of ratification.”61 Treaties that include 
such procedures might open the door to unintended consequences because the 
procedures delegate to an international organization the power to modify the 
treaty’s obligations without the approval of all of the state parties. The 
amendments may simply be tacit—changes that a state can prevent by 
objecting. Others, however, can take place even over a state’s objection. For 
example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
provides that the annexes, which specify which substances are to be controlled 
and by how much, can be amended by a vote of two-thirds of the members and 
will bind all members, including those who oppose the changes.62 This process 
has the potential to lead to unanticipated changes in the states’ legal 
obligations—changes over which they may have little control.63 
 
 60. Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell write, “It cannot be stressed enough that the Court 
initiated and sustained this process in the absence of express authorization of the Treaty, and despite 
the declared opposition of Member State governments.” Constructing a Supranational Constitution, in 
THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 45, 66 (2004). Some disagree with this interpretation of 
events. See, e.g., ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATES 
POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 472 (1998) (arguing that “European integration was a series 
of rational adaptations by national leaders to constraints and opportunities stemming from the 
evolution of an interdependent world economy, the relative power of states in the international system, 
and the potential for international institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments”). 
For more on the European transformation, see also KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE 
SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 
(2001). 
 61. Curtis Bradley, Unratified Treaty Amendments and Constitutional Process 1 (Feb. 6, 2006) 
(unpublished workshop paper), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/pdf/workshop06sp/ 
bradleyc.pdf. 
 62. United National Environment Programme, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer art. 2 ¶ 9(d), art. 10 ¶ 9, available at http://ozone.unep.org/pdfs/Montreal-
Protocol2000.pdf. 
 63. The unratified treaty amendments can also raise the type of problem discussed in the first 
subsection above (“Consent by Whom”). Bradley argues that unratified treaty amendments that allow 
the executive greater, sole control over the amendment process arguably delegate unconstitutional 
powers to the executive. More important, for the purposes of this paper, they create a lawmaking 
process that differs in important ways from the usual domestic lawmaking process. Bradley, supra note 
61. 
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) offers yet another example of the 
way in which international delegation might generate unintended consequences. 
The WTO puts in place two mechanisms that allow for change in members’ 
legal obligations over time. The first is the Dispute Settlement Body, which 
considers complaints filed by member states and then issues a decision. The 
Body has the power to make decisions that bind member states as a matter of 
international law; states must either follow the ruling or face sanctions.64 This 
mechanism delegates to the WTO the power to resolve disputes between state 
parties over the meaning of the treaty obligations they share and, by doing so, 
to address ambiguities in the treaty.65 In this way, the requirements of the treaty 
may evolve—or at least become more precise—over time, sometimes in ways 
states might not fully anticipate.66 
The second mechanism for implementing change in the WTO regime is by 
altering the terms of the agreement. Here, states cede limited, but real, 
authority. Amendments are generally made by a two-thirds vote of the 
members (and amendments are usually only binding on those who accept 
them).67 Modifications can be made outside the amendment process, however. 
Such changes formally require consensus of all members,68 but informally the 
 
 64. There is an ongoing debate as to whether a state that refuses to change its behavior as required 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding and faces sanctions as a consequence is acting in compliance 
with the treaty. It is not necessary to resolve that question here. It is enough to notice that the WTO 
does not provide for any further method of compulsion. See Steve Charnovitz, Recent Developments 
and Scholarship on WTO Enforcement Remedies, in INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TRADE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES 151 (Julio Lacarte & Jaime Granados, 
eds. 2004) (discussing recent enforcement mechanisms employed by the WTO). Compare Warren F. 
Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the 
World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002) (arguing that the WTO is a liability-rule 
system that promotes efficient breach), with John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute 
Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109 (2004) 
(arguing that the WTO imposes a property rule with an obligation to perform) and Joost Pauwelyn, 
How Strongly Should We Protect International Law? 2 (Mar. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) 
(“[I]nternational law is best protected on a sliding scale between strict inalienability and simple 
liability.”), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001309/01/How_strongly_should_we_ 
protect_and_enforce_IL.pdf. 
 65. Put another way, state parties delegate to the WTO the power to decide whether they can use 
trade measures in response to violations of the WTO agreement. 
 66. See, e.g., Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate?: Effects of WTO 
Jusicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (Winter 2008) (arguing 
that members are often bound by decisions of the WTO’s DSB, even when these decisions further 
policies that would not otherwise be supported in multilateral negotiations). 
 67. Article IX to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides, “Except as 
otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be 
decided by voting.” ¶ 1. Consensus is defined in the following way: “The body concerned shall be 
deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, 
present at the meeting where the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.” Art. IX 
¶ 1 n.1. 
 68. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides that most amendments 
be made by a two-thirds vote: 
 Amendments to provisions of this Agreement . . . of a nature that would alter the rights and 
obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members that have accepted them upon 
acceptance by two-thirds of the Members and thereafter for each other Member upon 
acceptance by it. The Ministerial Conference may decide by a three-fourths majority of the 
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process is often dominated by the most powerful members, leaving others with 
significantly less input and potentially subjecting them to changes they do not 
fully endorse.69 
One response to the concern that delegation might lead to unintended 
consequences centers on the intention of the state at the time it delegates. Yes, 
the state might not anticipate—and hence intend—every individual decision 
that the international body to which authority is delegated might make. But 
those acting on behalf of the state intentionally accede to a process that they 
must realize will lead to an evolution in the state’s legal obligations over time. 
Indeed, one might argue that this is precisely what the state representatives 
desire when they delegate the authority to make future decisions to 
international bodies. They want to have future decisions taken out of the 
government’s hands (whether for reasons of efficiency, to isolate themselves 
from the political fallout that otherwise might flow to them, or to tie the hands 
of their successors); they want the institutions to grow and evolve; and they 
want the institutions to broaden and deepen the legal commitment they have 
made to one another. Hence, to argue that the particular decisions these 
processes produce are “unintended” misses the broader point: Specific effects 
might be unintended by state actors, but the possibility for independent action 
by those to whom state actors delegate is usually wholly intended. 
There remains, nonetheless, the possibility that states could delegate 
authority to an international institution based on a particular set of expectations 
about what that institution will do, only to find that those expectations were 
wrong. In such cases, the presence of consent will not eliminate state-
sovereignty concerns. The international body may make wildly different 
substantive decisions than expected (for example, adopting a new substance to 
be regulated or a phase-out schedule once considered unimaginable), or might 
assert powers never anticipated. (The ECJ’s doctrine of direct effect might fit 
this characterization.) Delegations of this type can thus create tension with state 
sovereignty because they usurp the state’s authority to govern itself. 
Once again, this tension can be mitigated by states. To begin with, states 
could insist on conditional consent to delegations that might have unintended 
consequences. Once the delegation has been made, states may seek 
renegotiation of the treaty to eliminate an unintended consequence that has 
become apparent, or they might refuse to comply (albeit at some cost) with the 
terms of the renegotiated treaty. Permitting states to address unintended 
 
Members that any amendment made effective under this paragraph is of such a nature that 
any Member which has not accepted it . . . shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to 
remain a Member with the consent of the Ministerial Conference. 
Art. X ¶ 3. 
 69. See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining 
and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002) (analyzing the decisionmaking processes 
in the GATT/WTO). For a detailed account of the process of changing WTO law, see Hunter Nottage 
& Thomas Sebastian, Giving Legal Effect to the Results of WTO Trade Negotiations: An Analysis of the 
Methods of Changing WTO Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 989 (2006). 
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consequences after the fact through withdrawal or renegotiation makes it 
possible both to better protect state sovereignty and to ensure that delegations 
give rise to coordinated behavior that in fact serves the best interests of states. 
When states eschew these options—and instead choose to continue to 
participate in and comply with the regime—this offers some reason to think that 
the consequences may have been anticipated or are approved. Continued 
cooperation may also signal, however, that although there are sovereignty costs 
arising from the unintended consequences, the benefits of the international 
cooperation (or the reputational or other costs associated with withdrawal or 
noncompliance) outweigh the imposition on sovereignty. 
When an international delegation leads to unintended consequences, the 
state’s initial consent to the delegation does not by itself provide an adequate 
answer to concerns about the delegation’s imposition on state sovereignty. 
Hence, states should identify and use the many tools available to them to 
mitigate this important concern. 
D. Asymmetric Power 
The final point that complicates states’ consent to international delegation 
concerns the context in which the consent is given. I have argued here that the 
voluntary character of most international delegations greatly reduces the risk of 
“sovereignty costs” arising from them. Voluntariness, however, is not an either–
or state. When there are significant asymmetries in power between the parties 
to an international delegation, the weaker party’s consent may reflect the 
disproportionate influence of the stronger. The most familiar—and extreme—
instances of such asymmetric power are found when consent to a delegation is 
coerced. Less obvious, but more common today, are delegations generated 
when states with unequal power enter agreements that one or more of them 
simply cannot afford to refuse. 
Coerced agreements were once a significant problem for international law. 
Perhaps the most famous example comes from the mid-nineteenth century, 
when four U.S. naval vessels, commanded by Commodore Matthew Perry, 
sailed into Tokyo Bay in an effort force Japan to abandon two centuries of 
isolation.70 The resulting convention signed at Kanagawa in March opened the 
ports of Japan to trade with the United States.71 
 
 70. James Fallows, After Centuries of Japanese Isolation, A Fateful Meeting of East and West, 
SMITHSONIAN, July 1994, at 20. Commodore Perry’s entrance into Tokyo Bay was such a dramatic act 
of diplomacy that it later became the centerpiece of Stephen Sondheim’s musical Pacific Overtures. 
 71. Commodore Perry eventually went ashore for a tense meeting with Japanese officials, where he 
delivered a letter from President Millard Fillmore and promised to come back for an answer the 
following year with an even larger force. In February 1954, Commodore Perry made good on his 
promise, leading eight ships back into Tokyo Bay to begin negotiating. W.G. BEASLEY, THE RISE OF 
MODERN JAPAN 28–29 (1995). For a thorough discussion of Commodore Perry’s efforts to open Japan, 
see PETER BOOTH WILEY WITH KOROGI ICHIRO, YANKEES IN THE LAND OF THE GODS: 
COMMODORE PERRY AND THE OPENING OF JAPAN (1990), especially chapters 9 & 12. For 
Commodore Perry’s account, see THE JAPAN EXPEDITION, 1852–1854: THE PERSONAL JOURNAL OF 
COMMODORE MATTHEW C. PERRY (Roger Pineau ed., 1968). 
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Today, the threats are rarely so blatant. In fact, that kind of gunboat 
diplomacy is now illegal.72 Yet while modern-day exercise of asymmetric power 
is vastly more subtle, it can sometimes be just as effective. Strong states, for 
example, might promise foreign aid or enhanced trade access in return for 
cooperative behavior, or they might threaten sanctions or withdrawal of aid in 
return for uncooperative behavior. For example, the United States has pressed 
more than one hundred countries into concluding agreements to shield U.S. 
citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC).73 States 
that refuse to enter these U.S.-demanded “Article 98” agreements (so named 
for Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,74 which 
arguably authorizes such agreements) may be faced with withdrawal of U.S. 
military assistance and economic support.75 
Some instances of asymmetric power feature no promises or threats of 
sanction but nonetheless raise questions about how freely consent is given. 
Instead of threatening to penalize a state for failing to join a treaty that 
delegates authority, an international body, state, or group of states might simply 
offer a deal that is too good to refuse. Today, when membership in the World 
Trade Organization brings with it access to the markets of 150 other states,76 is 
membership in the WTO truly voluntary? Some might argue that it is virtually 
impossible for some states to choose to remain outside the regime; the benefits 
gained by joining it—and the benefits forgone by not joining it—are too high. 
Even more pernicious, some argue, are agreements that states join only to make 
the best of a bad situation: such states would prefer no international agreement 
at all, but once the agreement exists, they are better off joining to reduce the 
inevitable costs that the agreement imposes on them. 
 
 72. Entered into force in 1980, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a 
treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the “threat or use of force in violation of the 
principles of international law.” Art. 52. Hence today the Treaty of Peace and Amity between the 
United States and Japan, signed as it was under the shadow of a small armada of gunboats, would (and 
should) be void. 
 73. See Agreement Regarding the Surrender of Persons to the International Criminal Court, U.S.-
Swaz., May 10, 2006, State Dep’t No. 06-253, 2006 WL 4464971; Press Statement, United States 
Department of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
 74. UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. 
 75. Under the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), countries that belong to the 
ICC are not eligible for U.S. military assistance unless they are explicitly exempted in the ASPA 
legislation, the President waives the requirement for national-security reasons, or the President waives 
the requirement because the countries have concluded an Article 98 agreement with the United States. 
22 U.S.C. §7424 (b)–(c) (2000). Similarly, under the “Nethercutt Amendment,” originally passed as part 
of the Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations Bill, countries that belong to the ICC are not eligible for U.S. 
economic support funds unless they are statutorily exempted, the President waives the requirement for 
national-security reasons, or the President waives the requirement because the countries have 
concluded an Article 98 agreement with the United States. 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. No. 108–47, 117 Stat. 848. 
 76. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (showing 
151 members). 
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Lloyd Gruber argues that this is exactly what happened to Mexico in the 
mid-1980s: the 1987 Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement fed concerns in 
Mexico that the lower trade barriers between Canada and the United States 
would affect Mexico’s ability to compete in the American market. Mexico 
responded by scrambling to be included in the deal—even though doing so 
would force it to make faster and more significant political and economic 
changes than its people or its government supported. Mexico thus entered the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) not because the agreement 
would make it better off, Gruber argues, but because staying outside the 
agreement would have left the country worse off.77 
In all these cases, whether the delegation is insufficiently consensual 
depends in significant part on the nature of the threat faced by the state. Since 
Robert Nozick’s famous essay on the topic, most theorists have agreed that the 
making of a conditional threat is an essential factor in coercion.78 Nozick argues 
that a coercive threat is one that moves the recipient of the threat from a 
baseline, which he defines as the “normal or natural or expected course of 
events.”79 Building on Nozick’s approach, a majority of scholars have come to 
conclude that a proposal constitutes a threat if the proposer indicates that, if the 
demand is denied, the proposer will make the recipient worse off than the 
recipient ought to be.80 A similar consideration arises out of private contract 
law: contracts are generally assumed to be consensual, and thus enforceable, 
unless a party can show that the agreement was induced by one party’s 
improper threat that gave the other party no reasonable alternative but to 
assent.81 
 
 77. Lloyd Gruber, building on the work of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, among others, 
makes perhaps the most sustained argument along these lines in his book, RULING THE WORLD: 
POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 95–167 (2000). Gruber’s claim 
that Mexico did not join NAFTA because it expected the agreement to make it better off than it would 
have been absent an agreement between Canada and the United States is highly contestable as an 
empirical matter. However, the accuracy of the example on this point does not matter as much as does 
the broader dynamic that it aims to illustrate. 
 78. Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton White eds., 1969). Some think, 
however, that this view is too restrictive and that conditional offers might also be considered coercive. 
 79. Id. at 447. 
 80. Whether the recipient is made worse off than it ought to be is in turn determined by examining 
whether the proposer proposes to violate the recipient’s rights if the proposal is denied. ALAN 
WERTHEIMER, COERCION 217–21 (1987). Some international agreements might be seen not simply as 
offers but as what some have called “throffers”—proposals that make one better off than normal under 
one conditional, but worse off than normal under the alternative conditional. The term was coined by 
Hillel Steiner, Individual Liberty, PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y, at 33, 39 (1975), and the 
concept was discussed more recently in MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY, AND LIBERTY 
12 (1982). See also David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981) 
(examining the phenomenon of “coercive offers”). Whether a throffer is coercive or not depends again 
on whether the proposal constitutes a threat. 
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1979) (“If a party’s manifestation of 
assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). Of course, the exact bounds of this principle are 
far from clear. See John P. Dawson, Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 
289 (1947) (“The history of generalization in this field offers no great encouragement for those who 
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Both the harder and the softer forms of asymmetric power constrain the 
choices available to states or otherwise influence their decision. Yet not all can 
be said to meaningfully undermine state consent and hence state sovereignty. 
At one end of the spectrum stands the threat wielded by Commodore Perry.82 
The proposal offered to the Japanese, most would agree, promised to make 
them worse off than they ought to be if they refused to cooperate. A delegation 
made under these conditions should not be—and is not—considered 
consensual.83 
On the other hand, the indirect economic pressure of the kind allegedly 
faced by Mexico in the NAFTA negotiations does not constitute an improper 
threat. Mexico had no reasonable legal or moral claim to the status quo—it had 
no right, in other words, to prevent other countries from entering into 
agreements even if that agreement might indirectly harm Mexico. Indeed, few 
who care about state sovereignty would wish for a world in which Mexico could 
force the United States and Canada not to enter an agreement with one another 
simply because their agreement threatens to put Mexico at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
States acting individually and collectively can address the problem of 
coercion in international delegations. International law already includes rules 
prohibiting coerced agreements, and these rules should be vigorously enforced. 
Moreover, states can act to minimize the problem both by refraining from 
making threatening proposals and by refusing to respond to attempts at 
improper persuasion. 
The possibility of asymmetric power has the potential to complicate the 
simple story of consent that began this section. However, the reality of 
international delegation rarely involves such compromised consent that it 
undermines the sovereignty of the assenting state. It can be safely assumed that 
most states assent to most expressions of international law most of the time 
because they believe they are better off in doing so, sovereignty costs 
notwithstanding. 
IV 
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION:  
THE BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 
I have argued that the tension between state sovereignty and international 
delegation is of much narrower scope than is generally assumed. When states 
 
seek to summarize results in a single formula.”); Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion 
33–38 (Univ. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 04-005, Mar. 3, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=512903. 
 82. A proposal need not involve military pressure to constitute a threat. Today, national economies 
are highly intertwined and interdependent, hence the threat of coordinated economic sanctions can 
carry force just as surely as does a gun. 
 83. Many would not consider it a delegation at all, for the term “delegation” is generally reserved 
for voluntary acts by the delegating state. 
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consent to delegation, that delegation is often most accurately seen as an 
exercise of state sovereign power. Impositions on domestic authority structures 
do sometimes arise—when those who consent to international delegations are 
different from those who make domestic law, when there are time-inconsistent 
preferences or unintended consequences, and when consent is the result of 
asymmetric power. But these impositions are not nearly as large as critics 
assume. 
All of the discussion thus far has focused only on the potential threats to 
state sovereignty posed by international delegation. The conflicts between state 
sovereignty and international delegation are admittedly real, but they are vastly 
overstated. Whatever their exact level—which can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis—the fact remains that sovereignty costs represent only half 
the equation. On the other side of the ledger are the benefits that international 
delegations provide to states, benefits that can be substantial. Thus, it is 
important to ask not only when and why international delegation impinges on 
sovereignty, but also when and why international delegation is in a state’s best 
interest despite this potential impingement. 
The simple truth is that international delegation is sometimes the only 
way—or the least costly way—for states to achieve their goals, including 
maximizing their state power over the long term. Thus a country may cede 
authority over a decision or accept certain limits on its future action in order to, 
for example, project its ideology or constrain the actions of other states without 
using military force. A state may also accept restrictions on domestic authority 
in order to achieve ends that it shares with others who similarly restrict their 
own authority—that is, to coordinate or cooperate. 
This is an instrumental argument in favor of international delegation. There 
is also a moral one: International delegation sometimes serves to protect 
individuals against actions that sovereign nations should not be permitted to 
take. Here, raw state interest takes a back seat to the broader interests of a 
state’s citizenry, though in many cases state leaders believe strongly that states 
benefit from making these commitments. 
A. The Instrumental Argument: Efficacy of the State 
There is a paradox at the heart of international law. International law is 
founded on the idea that states are sovereign. And yet the very purpose of 
international law is to restrict the freedom of states to act as they (more 
specifically, those who govern them) wish. Of course, as already discussed at 
length, many of these restrictions arise out of state consent and hence cannot 
truly be said to undermine state sovereignty—or they do so only in the very 
narrow circumstances described above. Nonetheless, they do limit, in some way, 
the future behavior of the state and subject it to the authority of outside actors. 
How might this imposition on the state be justified? 
One answer is that restrictions of the kind imposed by international law—
and particularly international delegations—can be necessary to states’ pursuit of 
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their true ends. Just as Ulysses bound himself to the mast to avoid the Sirens 
and return home safely, states bind themselves to international law in order to 
avoid short-term temptations and thereby achieve their longer-term goals. 
States are willing, in other words, to sacrifice some of their range of freedom to 
achieve goals that would be difficult or impossible for them to otherwise 
achieve. 
The idea that imposing limits on future action can enhance, rather than 
restrict, freedom is certainly not limited to international law. Isaiah Berlin, for 
instance, speaks of positive liberty—the freedom to achieve certain ends—as 
opposed to negative liberty—the freedom from external coercion.84 Freedom to 
achieve ultimate ends sometimes rests on forfeiting some degree of freedom 
from external constraint.85 Jon Elster, too, speaks of human beings as distinct in 
that we are able to act as “globally maximizing machines”—capable of waiting 
and using indirect strategies, of deferring gratification to achieve longer-term 
ends. In particular, he writes that individuals may bind themselves as did 
Ulysses as a “way of resolving the problem of weakness of will; the main 
technique for achieving rationality by indirect means.”86 
There is an entire school of international-relations theory devoted to 
making a similar claim. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new approach to 
international relations—later dubbed “institutionalism”87—emerged in response 
to realist claims that states could not both seek their self-interest and engage in 
meaningful international cooperation. Institutionalists argued instead that 
effective regimes (including treaty regimes) could emerge to allow countries to 
engage in cooperative activity by restraining short-term power maximization in 
pursuit of long-term goals.88 States will create and comply with international 
 
 84. Many have questioned whether this dichotomy is real or specious. Some argue that the two are 
indistinguishable in practice while others contend that one cannot exist without the other. (For 
example, it is commonly argued that preservation of negative liberty requires positive action by 
government to prevent some from taking the liberty of others.) 
 85. This, in turn, Berlin worried, opened the door to totalitarianism. He says, 
Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to 
bully, oppress, torture in the name, and on behalf, of their “real” selves, in the secure 
knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man . . . must be identical with his freedom. 
ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 180 (1969). Philip Pettit, among others, attempts to overcome this problem 
by proposing a third conception of freedom, which he and others dub “republican freedom.” See PHILIP 
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM (1997) (arguing for a theory of freedom as “non-domination,” with 
domination distinct in important ways from interference). 
 86. ELSTER, supra note 47, at 37. 
 87. This school of thought has been variously recast as “modified structural realism,” 
“intergovernmental institutionalism,” “neoliberal institutionalism,” and “new institutionalism.” See 
OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD JONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS 49–78 (2005). 
 88. Early on, “regimes” were defined as “principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area,” STEPHEN D. KRASNER, Structural Causes 
and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (Stephen 
D. Krasner ed., 1983), and as “sets of governing arrangements” that include “networks of rules, norms, 
and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects,” ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. 
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 19 (1977). They required 
neither formal institutions nor enforcement powers, and hence much of the ensuing literature on 
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legal rules, in this view, as a winning long-term strategy to obtain self-interested 
ends. In other words, states act to maximize their own well-being and, indeed, 
their power through cooperative means. 
More recently, Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist, made a similar 
observation in the context of state sovereignty. Writing of what he calls 
“cosmopolitan sovereignty,” he argues, “if sovereignty is measured in terms of 
political clout—that is, by the extent to which a country is capable of having an 
impact on the world stage, and of furthering the security and well-being of its 
people by bringing its judgments to bear[,]” then “increasing interdependence 
and cooperation, that is, a decrease in autonomy, can lead to an increase in 
sovereignty. Thus, sharing sovereignty does not reduce it; on the contrary, 
sharing actually enhances it.”89 
States might relinquish some autonomy to obtain broader goals in a variety 
of specific ways. First, they might enter into international agreements as a way 
of projecting their own values, ideology, and commitment to fair play to others 
without engaging in costly military conquest. Human-rights law, in particular, 
might be understood as a mechanism for states with commitments to certain 
fundamental protections to encourage other states to adopt those same 
protections for their own citizens. Similarly, international law might be viewed 
as a way for weaker countries to bind stronger states to rules of conduct. In 
short, law can be a relatively low-cost means for states to control one another’s 
behavior. It might even be seen as a mechanism for governments to control 
future governments of their own country. Andrew Moravcsik argues, for 
example, that weak democracies pressed to delegate significant powers to 
European institutions through the European Convention on Human Rights 
because they hoped that by doing so they might prevent future backsliding on 
human-rights protections in their own countries.90 
Second, states might enter into international agreements that entail 
delegations of authority as a relatively costless way of coordinating their 
activity. They might delegate some authority and accept minor restrictions on 
their freedom of action in order to obtain collective as well as individual 
efficiency. There are international agreements, for example, that establish 
uniform overflight rules that allow airlines to fly more directly and more safely 
 
regimes focused on informal cooperation and largely ignored traditional international organizations 
and international law. Yet the most recent work in this vein has adopted a broader view of institutions 
that encompasses law as well as international legal institutions. In this view, legal institutions, like other 
institutions, are seen as “rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors face.” 
Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 768 
(2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Ulrich Beck, The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & 
SOCIETY 39, 48–49 (2002). See also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 
(1995) (discussing the negotiation, adaptation, and implementation of modern international treaties). 
 90. Moravcsik, supra note 9, at 226 (“[I]nternational institutional commitments, like domestic 
institutional commitments, are self-interested means of ‘locking in’ particular preferred domestic 
policies . . . in the face of future political uncertainty.”). 
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between states,91 provide uniform technical standards for railways to permit cars 
to easily pass from one state to another,92 allow citizens of one state to drive in 
another,93 and ensure that when they do, they will find recognizable road signs 
and signals.94 The same can be said of a vast array of international regulatory 
agreements that establish standards for mail, commerce, weights and measures, 
and the like. These agreements work not because they are costless, but because 
they help states coordinate their behavior and thereby establish a regime that 
makes all those that participate better off. 
Third, and perhaps most significant, states might enter into agreements that 
delegate authority to an international body in order to overcome a collective-
action dilemma. Such agreements generally require reciprocal commitments by 
states—states agree to refrain from acting in certain ways in order to get others 
to do the same. Hence, for example, states negotiate and enforce lower trade 
barriers between them,95 agree to forgo taxing income earned by their citizens in 
another’s jurisdiction,96 and offer certain legal protections to the financial 
investments by the citizens of another country.97 States jointly agree to protect 
migratory species such as turtles, whales, and birds; have begun to tackle global 
warming; and peacefully share and manage fishery stocks and the oil and 
 
 91. The International Air Services Transit Agreement, in conjunction with many bilateral 
agreements and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, permits civilian aircraft to fly across 
the territories of state parties without obtaining prior permission. See International Air Service Transit 
Agreement (1944), available at http://dgca.nic.in/int_conv/Chap_II.pdf; Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (known as the Chicago Convention) (9th ed. 2006) (1944), available at 
http://www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/7300.html (follow appropriate links for original and subsequent 
editions) (last visited Sept. 2, 2007). The Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air (1999), available at 
http://www.condonlaw.com/attachments/montreal_1999.pdf, standardizes and internationalizes the 
various liability regimes under which air carriers operate.  
 92. The 1886 Convention on Technical Uniformity provides for uniform construction and 
maintenance of rolling stock and loading of railway wagons among member states. See International 
Law: 100 Ways It Shapes Our Lives (American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.) 2006, 
at 14, available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/asil_100_ways_05.pdf (listing one hundred ways international 
law affects the daily lives of citizens). 
 93. The 1949 United Nations Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 19, 1949, 125 U.N.T.S. 22, 
available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXI/subchapB/treaty1.asp (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2007), allows citizens of member states to obtain an international driver’s license. 
 94. The 1968 UN Convention on Road Traffic, Nov. 8, 1968, available at 
http://www.geocities.com/bkkriders/law/unc/road1968.pdf, facilitates and encourages the use of 
universal traffic rules, road signs, and signals in member states.  
 95. For example, the Agreement Establishing the WTO, and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 96. This is one purpose of bilateral tax treaties, of which there are hundreds. See, e.g., Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123 (2003) 
(evaluating the failure of efforts to negotiate multilateral investment treaties and observing that 
thousands of bilateral investment treaties are in force). 
 97. There are hundreds of bilateral investment treaties between states. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483 (2004) (comparing international 
law with international tax law). 
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mineral resources of the seabed.98 In short, states repeatedly delegate decisions 
to international bodies to achieve goals that would be much more difficult, if 
not impossible, for even the most powerful of them to achieve on their own. 
Agreements that allow states to project their values, to coordinate their 
activity, and to overcome collective-action dilemmas do constrain state action in 
particular ways. But those restrictions of sovereign authority cannot be viewed 
in isolation from the benefits they yield, including states that are stronger and 
more effective in achieving their goals, and hence potentially more, not less, 
capable of acting independently. 
B. The Moral Argument: Human Rights 
While the instrumental case for seeing benefits in international delegations 
is straightforward and widely accepted, if not always widely appreciated, the 
moral case is much more controversial. At the heart of much of the debate over 
international law lies a basic divide between those who believe that the nature 
of state sovereignty has changed as a consequence of the rise of human rights 
and those who do not. The first group sees state sovereignty as inherently 
bounded by certain limits established by core human-rights norms. The second 
group instead sees sovereignty as bounded only by those limits that the 
sovereign state itself accepts—and then only insofar as the sovereign state 
wishes to be bound.99 
Those who take the position that sovereignty is limited by human-rights 
norms may disagree about where exactly those limits should lie—whether to 
draw the line quite narrowly at, for example, unlawful violations of basic bodily 
integrity through torture, genocide, political killing, and disappearance, or to 
draw it more broadly to encompass rights to health, education, food, and a 
living wage. But they all accept the underlying idea that certain limits, whatever 
they may be, exist.100 
 
 98. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf; Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 
available at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml#texttop (last visited Sept. 2, 2007); International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, available at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/convention.pdf. 
 99. This section, which is less applicable to international delegations than to international law more 
generally, is included in order to establish the point—not addressed by any other paper in this 
symposium—that sovereign consent is not the sole source of international legal legitimacy. This is, of 
course, only the beginning of an argument that deserves more complete treatment than can be offered 
here. 
 100. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 
31 (1995–1996) (suggesting that a half-century of human rights has been the cause, or the result, or 
both, of changes in international law, the international system, and the spread of “constitutionalism,” 
and stating that those changes have undermined assumptions about state sovereignty); W. Michael 
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 
869 (1990) (stating that contemporary international law protects the people’s, as opposed to the states’, 
sovereignty, and that internal human rights no longer fall completely within the jurisdiction of an 
individual state, but instead are the concern of the international community); Kofi Annan, Two 
Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49, available at  
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Critics of this position sometimes seize upon the uncertainty about the 
precise limits placed by human rights on state sovereignty as evidence that the 
position is untenable. They note that the disagreement reflects a fundamental 
problem with the argument—that is, the absence of any specific, legitimate 
source for this fundamental core of human rights. How can the law be 
legitimate, they ask, if its source is unidentified, or, even worse, if it simply 
derives from natural-law principles? When law is derived in this way, they 
argue, it serves as a cloak for morality, not law. And imposing morality as if it 
were law thereby imposes the cultural biases and religious beliefs of those who 
frame these “laws” on those who do not share them. Such critics cite the 
expansion of “rights” language to include a diverse array of issues, including 
labor rights, rights to food, rights to health care, and a right to be free from 
poverty.101 
These concerns are not without merit. The position that domestic authority 
can be limited by human rights sometimes leads to such an expansive view of 
human rights that rights principles threaten to unjustifiably override the 
principles of self-determination and autonomy. Nonetheless, the critics are 
wrong to argue that human rights cannot be justified as an external limit on 
state authority. State sovereignty, after all, is itself a social and legal construct—
a creation of the modern international legal system. Indeed, in the history of 
humanity, state sovereignty is a relatively new concept.102 A sovereign state 
gains its very existence from the international community. 
If a sovereign state is created by the international community, then it makes 
sense that its existence can be predicated on certain elemental requirements, 
including that it show respect for the sovereign rights of other states and for 
fundamental human rights of their citizens. States receive the benefits of state 
sovereignty under international law—most notably, the protection from the 
“threat or use of force” against them. They are recognized as the proper legal 
representative for the people located within a certain geographic area, 
deserving of formally equal treatment among other similarly situated 
 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/kaecon.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007) (declaring that state 
sovereignty is being redefined and states are being recast as “instruments at the service of their 
people”: “the aim [of the UN Charter] is to protect individual human beings, not . . . those who abuse 
them”). 
 101. For two views on whether rights language should be used in discussions of economic issues, see, 
for example, the debate between David Ellwood, Jeffery Frankel & Amartya Sen, Human Rights 
Debate: Is the Language of Rights Useful in the Fight Against Poverty? (Harvard Univ. Instit. of Pol., 
JFK Jr. Form Video and Podcast Archive, Feb. 11, 2005), available at 
http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_listview.asp?Type=PS (scroll down to “2/11/2005” and 
choose Real Player link) (last visited Sept. 2, 2007) (addressing the utility of human rights language in 
discussions on poverty); see also Christiana Ochoa, Advancing the Language of Human Rights in a 
Global Economic Order: An Analysis of a Discourse, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 57 (2003) (discussing 
how human rights and international economic discourses intersect). 
 102. The origins of the nation-state were long traced to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Today, 
however, most scholars agree it is, in fact, the invention of nineteenth-century Europe. See, e.g., 
Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 
(2001) (“[Westphalia is] a product of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century fixation on the concept of 
sovereignty.”). 
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representatives and capable of bargaining and entering agreements on behalf of 
those they represent. In return, states should have to accept some very basic 
limits on their behavior. Those entities that are not members of the 
international community do not have all the obligations membership entails, 
but they also do not receive all the protections it affords.103 
This exchange is symbolized by and embodied in states’ accession to the UN 
Charter.104 To be permitted to accede to the Charter, a state must be recognized 
by the international community as the proper representative of a particular 
legal and political entity. This entrance into the Charter and into the 
international community brings recognition of a state’s international legal 
sovereignty, thus granting it a “ticket of general admission to the international 
arena.”105 At the same time, the Charter carries with it certain obligations, 
among them that the state recognize similar rights in other similarly recognized 
states and that it observe basic limits on its treatment of its own citizens. These 
limits are found in the preamble to the Charter itself, as well as in the statute of 
the International Court of Justice, which is incorporated into the treaty and 
which explicitly recognizes certain fundamental principles of international law.106 
Modern sovereignty is therefore not unconditional: to become a full 
participant in the international community, a state must accept that its 
sovereignty will be limited by basic human-rights principles. How far does this 
acceptance have to extend? At a minimum, it must extend to a fundamental 
core of human rights on which there is universal or close to universal 
agreement—that is, limits on government action that are shared by nearly every 
culture and religion, at least in aspiration, if not always in reality. This 
 
 103. UN Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2007) (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 104. This view of the Charter as a covenant that conditions membership in the community is not 
without precedent. It is, indeed, reflected in the recent report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change. The panel wrote, “In signing the Charter of the United Nations, States not 
only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept its responsibilities.” It continued, 
“Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of 
State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its 
own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community.” United Nations, 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. 
 105. MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN 
STATE 12 (1995). 
 106. Article 92 of the UN Charter incorporates the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See 
UN Charter art. 92, para. 4, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2007) (“The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.”); id. 
art. 93, para. 1 (“All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.”). The Statute of the International Court of Justice, in turn, provides 
that the Court, “whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 
Art. 38 §§ 1, 1(b) 1945. This article of the statute is generally regarded as a definitive statement of the 
proper sources of international law. 
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fundamental core would include, for example, prohibitions on state-sanctioned 
torture, genocide, and political killings. 
Some would argue for a larger core; others might argue for a smaller one. 
While such arguments will never be definitive, neither will they be 
unconstrained. To make the case that human-rights principles extend beyond 
this fundamental core, advocates will need to show that the additional limits on 
government action they demand also reflect broadly and deeply held norms. To 
make the case that even the core is too expansive, critics will have to show that 
the normative commitments referenced by advocates and international leaders 
do not, in fact, exist. Human-rights protections, in short, are the result of an 
evolving conversation. In an increasingly global society with changing social 
norms, how could it be otherwise? 
If nothing else, imagining the alternative—a world in which there are no 
exogenous limits on state sovereignty and all discussions and actions directed 
toward establishing such limits are considered out-of-bounds—makes the case 
for taking human rights seriously. If there were no limits on state action, then a 
state could openly and flagrantly violate its own citizens’ basic human rights, 
and no outside entity would be justified in intervening to stop it. Moreover, 
those who engaged in such acts could not be held responsible. Nuremberg, the 
International Court for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Court for 
Rwanda, and efforts to address the ongoing crimes in Darfur through the 
International Criminal Court would all be seen as unjustified impositions of 
external morality. The inevitable disagreement about the boundaries of core 
human rights should not lead to the frightening position that there are no 
boundaries at all. And if there are such boundaries, as there undeniably are, 
then there is yet another powerful justification for international law. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The modern scope of international delegation is vast and growing. Today, 
international organizations are delegated authority not just over how states 
behave toward one another, but over issues that touch on almost every area of 
domestic governance. From the WTO’s regulation of trade policy, to the UN 
Security Council’s rules regarding terrorist financing, to the Committee on 
Torture’s interpretation of the permitted interrogation techniques, to the World 
Health Organization’s vaccination guidelines, international organizations are 
increasingly playing an important role in the internal affairs of states. 
This growing international influence has not been without controversy or 
resistance. Increasingly, scholars and public leaders alike worry that the benefits 
of international delegation come at too high a cost. They ask, does delegating 
authority to others means that states are less able to make decisions for 
themselves even on issues that have little to do with cross-border interactions? 
I have argued in this article that the answer is almost always no. When states 
consent to international delegations and retain ongoing power to monitor and 
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revoke that authority (as is generally the case), they lose little or no meaningful 
sovereign authority in the bargain. Under these circumstances, delegation is 
better seen as a mechanism through which states exercise—and even expand—
their sovereign authority, than as a surrender of it. 
Nonetheless, consent to international delegations does not entirely resolve 
the conflict between delegation and state sovereignty. Complicating the idea of 
sovereign consent are concerns about who consents for the states, time-
inconsistent preferences of state governments, unintended consequences of 
delegations, and asymmetric power between parties. Hence, even in a world in 
which international delegations are made voluntarily by states, there is still a 
potential for tension between international delegation and state sovereignty. 
Exploring this tension is essential for thinking about the true costs of 
international delegation. 
With a clearer picture of the costs of delegation in view, the natural question 
is whether these costs are justified. What, if anything, lies on the other side of 
international delegation’s balance sheet? I have offered two answers: First, 
delegations may allow a state to pursue its true ends more effectively or 
efficiently than would otherwise be possible, enhancing a state’s long-term 
sovereign authority in the process. Second, delegations may protect people’s 
most basic human rights against incursions by the state. These benefits can 
outweigh, often vastly, any costs states incur in agreeing to international 
delegations. 
To be sure, state leaders and analysts still need to weigh the costs imposed 
on domestic sovereign authority against the benefits of international 
cooperation and protections to human rights. The line between acceptable and 
unacceptable international delegations ultimately must be drawn through the 
democratic political process. This process, however, ought to be informed by an 
understanding of the true tradeoffs that delegation offers—its benefits as well as 
its costs. 
